Prologue:
Global governance is no longer a new phenomenon -after all, the notion became prominent two decades ago -but it still retains an aura of 'mystery'. We know much about many of its instantiations -institutions, actors, norms, beliefs -yet we sense that seeing the trees does not necessarily enable us to see the forest. We would need grander narratives for this purpose, and somehow in the muddle of thousands of different sites and players, broader maps remain elusive.
One anchor that has oriented much work on global governance in the past has been the assumption that we are faced with a structure 'without government'. However laudable the results of this move away from the domestic frame, with its well-known institutions that do not find much correspondence in the global sphere, it has also obscured many similarities, and it has clouded classical questions about power and justification in a cloak of technocratic problem-solving. In response, governmental analogies are on the rise again, especially among political theorists and lawyers who try to come to terms with the increasingly intrusive character of much global policy-making. 'Constitutionalism' and 'constitutionalization' have become standard frames, both for normative guidance and for understanding the trajectories by which global institutions and norms are hedged in. 'Administration', another frame, also serves to highlight proximity with domestic analogues for the purpose of analysing and developing accountability in global governance.
In the project of which this symposium is a part, we have recourse to a third frame borrowed from domestic contexts -that of 'public authority'. It seeks to reflect the fact that much of the growing contestation over global issues among governments, NGOs, and other domestic and trans-national institutions draws its force from conceptual analogies with 'traditional rule'. Such contestation often assumes that institutions of global governance exercise public authority in a similar way as domestic government and reclaims central norms of the domestic political tradition, such as democracy and the rule of law, in the global context. The 'public authority' frame captures this kind of discourse but avoids the strong normative implications of constitutionalist approaches, or the close proximity to particular forms of institutional organization characteristic of 'administrative' frames. In the project, it is used as a heuristic device, rather than a normative or analytical fix point: it is a lens through which we aim to shed light on processes of change in global governance. The papers in the present symposium respond to a set of broad questions about these processes: what is the content of new normative claims? which continuities and discontinuities with domestic traditions characterise global governance? how responsive are domestic structures to global governance? How is global governance anchored in societies? and which challenges arise from the autonomy demands of national (and sometimes other) communities?
The papers gathered here speak to these questions from different disciplinary perspectives -they come from backgrounds in political science, international relations, political theory, European law and international law. But they speak across disciplinary divides and provide nice evidence for how much can be gained from such engagement. They help us better understand the political forces behind claims for change in global governance; the extent of change in both political discourse and law; the lenses through which we make sense of global governance; and the normative and institutional responses to competing claims. Overall, they provide a subtle picture of the pressure global governance is under, both in practice and in theory, to change its ways. They provide attempts to reformulate concepts from the domestic context, such as subsidiarity, for the global realm. But they also provide caution us against jumping to conclusions about the extent of change so far. After all, much discourse about global governance -and many of its problems -continue in intergovernmental frames. Global governance may face a transition, but where its destination lies is still unclear. 'Public authority' is an analytical and normative frame that helps to formulate and tackle many current challenges, though certainly not all. Many questions and challenges remain, but we hope that this symposium takes us a step closer to answering them.
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Nico Krisch, Professor of International Law, Hertie School of Governance some versions of subsidiarity may match current practices of public international law, these are more questionable than the accounts that grant states a less central role in a legitimate multi-level legal and political order. If subsidiarity is to serve as a 'constitutional principle' for public international law, many crucial aspects of our legal order must be reconsidered -in particular the standing and scope of state sovereignty.
'Subsidiarity' is sometimes hailed as a promising 'structuring principle' for international law. Subsidiarity has emerged as a prominent concept in legal and political theory, not least due to its inclusion in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty on European Union.
A "principle of subsidiarity" regulates how to allocate or use authority within a political or legal order, typically in those orders that disperse authority between a centre and various member units. 1 The principle holds that the burden of argument lies with attempts to centralize authority. Thus the conception of subsidiarity as laid out by the Lisbon Treaty (LT) holds that in those issue areas where the states and the EU share authority, the member states should decide -unless central action will ensure higher comparative efficiency or effectiveness in achieving the specified objectives.
Scholars appeal to subsidiarity not only to negotiate centralization and diversity in EU law, 2 but to determine the limits of sovereignty 3 ; and possibly for international law more generally. 4 Some claim that a principle of subsidiarity should apply to human rights law in particular, 5 for instance to reform the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 6 Such claims go beyond the empirical point that states are central in explanations of how public international law is created. A principle of subsidiarity may serve at least two further helpful functions with regard to international law. The second role is as a way to structure legal and political debates that engages both normative and empirical premises on such issues as the allocation of authority between national and international institutions. 7 A principle of subsidiarity does indeed seem to not only explain but also provide some intellectual order to features that express the centrality of 1 ANDREAS FOLLESDAL, Subsidiarity, 6 Journal of Political Philosophy (1998 HUMAN RIGHTS, Interlaken Declaration, February 19, (2010) ). 7 (Kumm 2009, 295) . sovereign states in international law. This centrality includes: An understanding of the main social function of public international law as supplementing domestic law; the centrality of state consent in creating such legal obligations; the requirement that national remedies must be exhausted before turning to international courts and treaty bodies; the ECtHR practice of granting states a 'Margin of Appreciation' when assessing whether they are in compliance with their obligations; and the often weak treaty sanctions.
A third function of subsidiarity goes beyond the order it provides, and concerns why we have reason to value such state centrality, serving as a normative 'Constitutional Principle.' As a source of normative legitimacy external to the treaties it can help justify international law -in particular these features of state centrality. Such presumptions for the centrality of states occur in several contributions to international political theory, ranging from Michael Walzer's 'communitarian' "The Moral Standing of States" 8 to John Rawls' much critiqued 'liberal' Law of Peoples. 9 They both aspire to defend the normative primacy of the nation state that may undergird state centric versions of subsidiarity. This third, justificatory function of subsidiarity is also crucial to its value as a structuring principle: Such a value depends in part on whether the resulting structure merits support and deference. A normative constitutional principle of this kind may for instance help assess whether the genesis of much public international law in state consent renders it more -or less -worthy of deference. The present article addresses and challenges this normative role.
I shall argue that while a state centric conception of subsidiarity may indeed support these features of state centrality in public international law, more defensible conceptions of subsidiarity challenge precisely these features. The upshot is that as a normatively defensible constitutional principle for international law, subsidiarity questions the centrality of states, since the most plausible conceptions of subsidiarity fail to justify the present centrality of states in international law. To defend these claims we must first discern and assess the state centric versions of subsidiarity. Section 1 aids in this by presenting a backdrop of different historical and normative traditions, with significant implications for issues of sovereignty and the allocation of authority. The section explores five such theories, with particular attention to four aspects: a) whether they stress immunity for smaller units, or the obligations of larger units to assist. b) the fundamental units of normative concern: states -or individuals. c) who should have authority to specify the objectives and interests to be protected and promoted, and to decide whether more centralised action is required: the member units, or central authorities. d) whether this version of subsidiarity is amenable to be applied not only to relations between individuals and their state, but also to relations between different levels of legal authority. These five versions are drawn from the history of political ideas.
While possibly not exhaustive of the taxonomy of principles of subsidiarity, they suffice to indicate these crucial variations.
Some of these conceptions are more convincing than others, when assessed from normative perspectives committed to cosmopolitan normative individualism. Such normative traditions hold firstly, that individual human beings are the only relevant units of intrinsic, ultimate normative concern. This is of course not to deny that societies, norms and other social features matter normatively, but rather that the chief value of culture is the value of cultural membership, both intrinsic and instrumental, for individuals. 10 Secondly, this normative perspective is cosmopolitan in that every person is accorded equal status as ultimate units of moral concern 11 -which is distinct from institutional or legal cosmopolitanism that is committed to a global, centralized legal order.
Section 2 presents the version of subsidiarity found in the EU's Lisbon Treaty as one central case, with attention to the assumptions and role as a legal and multi-level principle. This "Lisbon Subsidiarity" has several distinct features, strengths and weaknesses that are often ignored -which may explain why so many endorsed the principle when first presented in the Maastrict Treaty. The weaknesses are more severe for the more state centric version of subsidiarity allegedly found in international law, or so I argue in section 3. The implication is that a principle of subsidiarity worth endorsing cannot help justify the state centrality of international law, its defenders' high hopes notwithstanding.
Traditions of Subsidiarity
There are several versions of subsidiarity, with very different implications for the allocation of authority. They differ as to the objectives of the member units and the central authorities, the domain and roles of member units such as states, how they allocate the authority to apply the principle of subsidiarity itself, and how the conceive of the relationship between different levels of political authority. To mention some concern is perhaps most vividly underscored by the fact that the South African practice of apartheid and separation into "homelands" was long regarded as justified precisely by this tradition of subsidiarity, of "sovereignty in one's social circle." 13 Some guidance might follow from the value of freedom as absence of constraints by public authorities, which forms the basis of Althusius' argument for associations' immunity. But the grounds and scope of this paramount interest in non-intervention remain to be identified. This lack of principles for assessing candidate member units is a weakness shared with some more recent political theories in the communitarian tradition. Thus Michael Walzer's presumption for respect for sovereign borders even when some brutality occurs within has been roundly criticized. 14 Note that on Althusius' conception of subsidiarity the common good to be pursued by a central political unit is limited to those undertakings deemed by every subunit to be of their interest, compared to their status quo. While this account allows for negotiation among sub-unit representatives based on existing preferences and resources, full agreement on ends is not expected -which is why subsidiarity is required in the first place. This account of the common good does not seem to allow any accommodation of differential organizational resources or bargaining positions; and any coercive redistributive arrangements among individuals or associations are deemed illegitimate. The upshot is that this account suffers severe problems when some subunits -associations or states -lack normative legitimacy, or when inter-state inequities raise fears of domination, or concerns for distributive justice.
b. Liberty: Confederalists
Similar conclusions emerge from confederal arguments for subsidiarity based on the fear of tyranny. This view starts from plausible assumptions that individuals should not be subjected to the arbitrary will of others in matters where no others are harmed, and that smaller groups are more likely to share preferences. Contributors to this conception include the American Confederalists, Montesquieu held that common interest is easier to see in a smaller setting, and Fritz Scharpf who makes similar arguments for subsidiarity in the European Union. 15 This may be thought to be best secured by decentralised government with powerful member units, as on the Althusian account.
Montesquieu suggested that homogeneity within member units secured unanimity, and this should be combined with a limited central agenda. Thus sub-units may veto decisions, or decide by qualified majoritarian votes. For instance, an agreement on the common end of defence should move on to a discussion of the best means of defence, rather than a more expansive discussion of other common ends. 16 In effect this line of thought support a proscriptive, state centric version of subsidiarity.
Three weaknesses of this view merit mention, some shared with the Althusian conception. Firstly, the exclusive focus on tyranny as the sole ill to be avoided is questionable. Such a minimalist conceptions of relevant interests may be regarded as responses to the bewildering pluralism of worldviews and conceptions of the good life.
To be sure, this version of subsidiarity may reduce the need for agreement across member units. By limiting the relevant set of interests, confederalism might be thought to avoid such contestation. But it is not correct that agreement is always easier to reach in small democracies with homogeneity of socio-economic circumstances and closed borders, where politicians are less likely to pursue own advantage, and where demands are stable over time. And these conditions are unlikely -as the American Federalist debate made clear. 17 So if this conception of subsidiarity is used to identify legitimate sub units, few candidates would be accepted.
The disagreement between libertarian, republican or 'communitarian' concern for non-domination versus liberal normative perspectives is not the only contested issue. A second normative concern is that perfect homogeneity is never achieved -even in small communities. As Madison pointed out, since it is unlikely that smaller units are completely homogeneous, the plight of minorities in local communities is uncertain.
Tyranny and other forms of domination of concern for republicans or libertarians may emerge more easily in small groups while it may be easier for minorities to muster courage in larger settings. 18 In the context of the European Union, similarly, abuse of centralized powers is not the only risk: "local abuse" of minorities by their domestic government is often a significant threat. So the risk of tyranny and other forms of domination does not support the strong immunity that this conception of subsidiarity accords member units. Some human rights protections by central authorities might thus 16 be well grounded. Thirdly, the best justification of this conception appears limited with regard to its conception of the common good: only as mutual advantage among the units. This means that subsidiarity will not allow net transfers to units that require more support in order to protect and promote the interests of their individual members, or to compensate for inequities in the bargain power among member units.
The upshot is that such state centric subsidiarity entails high risks for individuals, because member states enjoy immunity and close to veto power. There are clear tensions between individuals' interest in avoiding domination by their member unit, and the conception of subsidiarity which permits states to not so bind themselves.
These problems should be kept in mind when considering both the implications of Lisbon Subsidiarity, and for other state centric conceptions of subsidiarity as a structuring principle for international law as a whole.
c. Efficiency: Economic Federalism
The third conception of subsidiarity holds that powers and burdens of public goods should be placed with the populations that benefit from them. Decentralised government is to be preferred insofar as a) local decisions prevent overload, or b) targeted provision of public goods -i.e. 'club goods' -is more efficient in economic terms. This conception of subsidiarity seems to match some of the reasons that 'Eurosceptics' are wary of some forms of European cooperation that adds little value. This theory has broader ambitions than Althusian subsidiarity, in that it not only is concerned with competence allocation, but also aspires to provide standards for subunit identification. Member units do not enjoy veto powers, since free riding member units may be overruled to ensure efficient co-ordination and production of club or public goods, especially those that are non-excludable and inexhaustible. This approach will allow multi-level and overlapping legal orders that each secures desired cooperation.
One weakness of this view is that it is limited in scope to such goods that are to 1903-1939 (1981) principle, placing several issues outside the scope of politics -e.g. regarding religious affairs. Sub-units do not enjoy veto rights. Indeed, even application of the principle of subsidiarity is sometimes best entrusted to the centre unit. Non-intervention into smaller units may often be appropriate, both to protect individuals' autonomy, as required for their proper development, and to economize on the scarce resources of the state or other larger unit. Conversely, state intervention is legitimate and required when the public good is threatened, such as when a particular class suffers. This account of subsidiarity does allow taxation and other means of transfers across member units, as required for the 'common good' as defined by the authorities.
A weakness of this view concerns its premise on a contested conception of human nature as determined by a comprehensive controversial theology. It is thus easily subject to criticism when applied among parties who fail to share these values. One implication is that this account cannot settle beyond reasonable disagreement which sub-units and cleavages should be embedded -e.g. regarding families, or labour unions; -nor the role of the state or international bodies. This does make this theory more flexible and adaptable to various forms of social organization and societal development. However, problems do arise when coupled to the strong yet contested views about what the specific responsibilities should be, e.g. whether extended families, the state, the EU or the international community should be the guarantor of last resort to secure basic needs.
Consider the concerns about different, incompatible conceptions of human flourishing. Koskenniemi argues against dismissing the state: as long as there is no wide agreement on what constitutes the good life, the formality of statehood remains the best guarantee we have against the conquest of modernism's liberal aspect by modernism's authoritarian impulse. 21 (, 397, cited in , fn 166) Such disagreement should lead us to be wary of granting the authority to make decisions about flourishing to any authorities -regardless of how centralized or decentralized.
But such disagreements notwithstanding, the member units might still be able to agree 21 on certain basic needs, human rights etc. that are less open to challenge. So this concern about value pluralism is compatible with sub-units pooling certain powers to secure those objectives they and others agree are in citizens' interest. Indeed, human rights treaties that limit state sovereignty may be more robust against criticism based on value pluralism: These treaties and international efforts are not clearly aimed at promoting flourishing, but rather largely aimed at preventing abuse of state power that causes human harms. There is arguably more -but not full -agreement on such topics than on the details of human flourishing. members of sub-units, there is a case for subsidiarity both that central authorities should seek to support member units' democratic and informed decision making, and by respecting their immunity against influence -as long as the decisions respect the best interests of its members and avoids local domination. The fourth interest that supports subsidiarity concerns its role in character formation. The Principle of Subsidiarity can foster and structure political argument and bargaining in ways beneficial to public deliberation, and to the character formation required to sustain a just political order.
Public arguments about subsidiarity may facilitate the socialisation of individuals into the requisite sense of justice and concern for the common good. For this purpose the Principle of Subsidiarity need not provide standards for the resolution of issues, as long as it requires public arguments about the legitimate status of sub-units, the proper common goal, and the likely effects of sub-unit and centre-unit action.
In addition to these reasons concerning the interests of those within the member unit, there are further reasons for subsidiarity stemming from the interests of those in the rest of the legal order. They have an interest to avoid political power over issues that do not affect them, and that do not threaten the important interests of others. Such authority would require them to spend resources to determine alternatives and their consequences on affected parties, without any affect on themselves. They may reasonably want to be able to spend such resources on their other interests.
There are several weaknesses of this conception of subsidarity. It only provides a limited role and weight for this principle. Its defence of immunity is limited when vital interests or human rights are at stake, or when the common interests include distributive or redistributive norms, such as equalisation of living conditions across the member units. Such objectives are found in several federations, eg as stated in the German Grundgesetz: "the maintenance of legal or economic unity, especially the maintenance of uniformity of living conditions beyond the territory of any one land." 23 Such objectives cannot be ignored by most members of the larger legal order -to the contrary, it seems that most principles of subsidiarity . .However, this account does not single out states as the only relevant sub-units. A further weakness of such liberal contractualist arguments is that they underdetermine subsidiarity. for the exercise of political power could serve the same interests. And the case for subsidiarity would have to be filled out by theories of institutional design in order to suggest suitable institutional reforms. Whether sub-units should enjoy veto, votes or only voice is a matter of the likely effects when it comes to protecting human rights and other vital interests, on character formation, and on the likely effects to ensure that institutions remain sufficiently responsive to the best interests of citizens.
To conclude: these different conceptions of subsidiarity support drastically different powers and immunities for the member units. The normative assessment drawn from cosmopolitan normative individualism has challenged those conceptions that stress the immunity of member units regardless of their internal policies, and that grant them veto rights concerning any proposed centralised policies. Such conceptions seem to assume that the fundamental and ultimate units of normative concern are member units -states or communities -rather than individuals. Another conclusion concerns the authority to specify the objectives and interests to be protected and promoted -and to determine whether more centralised action is required. While basic needs and other vital interests may be relatively uncontroversial, it seems more difficult to defend authority used to promote controversial conceptions of the good life, such as aspects of Catholic social doctrines, -or economic efficiency over other important societal objectives, for that matter.
Subsidiarity in the Lisbon Treaty -compared and assessed
To illustrate how various conceptions of subsidiarity lend support different aspects of a legal order above the state, consider the Lisbon Treaty (LT) of the European Union, which entered into force in 2009. 24 At least five aspects of the LT underscore the prima facie preference for state authority over that of the EU. All five points illustrate why a principle of subsidiarity was explicitly introduced into the EU treaties starting with the Maastricht Treaty: Member states sought to defend against unwarranted centralisation and domination by Union authorities. Föderalismus Firstly, as all treaties go, the LT requires explicit consent by every EU member state. The competences and objectives of the EU are thus said to be identified, specified, and conferred by member states. Each state has determined that it is in their interest, broadly conceived, to pool some authority in order to better pursue certain joint actions. This is of course compatible with a prevalent claim among many observers that the EU's power has expanded beyond the member states' original intent. In the case of the European Court of Justice, J.H.H. Weiler has shown how it took it upon itself to in effect 'constitutionalize' the Community's legal structure. 25 Secondly, the treaty states that where the states and the EU share authority, EU competences are to be exercised respectful of a principle of subsidiarity. These points are both stated in Art 5.1:
The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
The principle of subsidiarity in the LT -'Lisbon Subsidiarity' -is stated thus:
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. 26 A third example of subsidiarity in the LT is the 'Yellow Card Procedure,' an innovative arrangement that allows national parliamentary review of proposed EU legislation. 27 National parliaments monitor proposed EU decisions and may appeal those thought to violate Lisbon Subsidiarity. This mechanism addresses the tensions and risks of undue centralisation when member units disagree with each other or with the central authorities whether joint action is required and efficacious, and when they disagree about how to weigh the different objectives. The 'Yellow Card' procedure concerns precisely this competence, and increases the role of member states. Some may worry that this procedure offers insufficient protection against 'competence creep' toward the centre, since the procedure only applies to certain kinds of legislation, and the national parliaments can only appeal to the legislative institutions, and not even to the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Further protection of member state authority might be offered by a fourth case of subsidiarity found in the LT's inclusion of various human rights protections. A principle of subsidiarity does not guarantee against domination or abuse of power, be it from central or more local authorities. The LT includes human rights norms in several ways.
Regulations of central authorities follow from LT Article 6, further specified in Protocol against subjection and domination by some others. Moreover, the limited number of issues on the EU agenda serves to reduce the risk of information overload, and foster joint gains among the member states. The deliberation fostered by subsidiarity can help build community, also within the EU bodies such as European Parliament, by preference formation towards the common good. 30 The deliberation about ends also supports an important sense of community for a minority: that these decisions are "ours", and can foster a sense among the majority about majority constraints.
Deliberation may thus enforce the boundary within which majoritarianism is accepted as a legitimate decision procedure. 31 The LT and the conception of subsidiarity avoids some of the problems of Althusian subsidiarity concerning a lack of standards of legitimacy for member units: All member states of the EU must be committed to human rights, at least in having ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and subject to its Court. This constraint on permitted states would seem to render Michael Walzer's claims about the moral standing of states more plausible as assessed from the point of view of normative individualism. Such human rights respecting states, but not all others, may arguable merit sovereignty based on the interests of their citizens that these states respect and promote. 32 The LT is also less 'state centric' in that is allows -as do Economic Federal and Catholic conceptions of subsidiarity -centre bodies to override member units for the sake of the stated objectives -such as the four freedoms. LT also includes 'polycentric' arrangements, e.g. to promote club goods among those who seek a common currency, another set of shared rules among a different set of member states concerning immigration, and so forth. 33 and divine law to serve the common interest 34 -and in the EU case, all member states must comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, and must comply with the EU treaty. On the other hand, the standards and objectives of the social order are to be taken as given -by God and his church, or by the EU treaties and their Guardian the Commission, respectively. 35 Disagreement about objectives or how to balance them are difficult to handle -by several conceptions of subsidiarity, including the Economic, and the Catholic, as well as in the LT. Still, the broad set of -fairly unobjectionableobjectives of the EU make for a very high number of conflicts regarding trade-offs.
Consider that the values and objectives include inter alia human rights, democracy, the rule of law, pluralism, tolerance, justice, gender equality, solidarity and nondiscrimination, social justice and protection, and subsidiarity. 36 The political challenge is obviously not to agree to such a list of values, norms, and principles but rather to specify and order them in a defensible way, and agree to common policies in their pursuit. It is by no means clear that appeals to subsidiarity will remove such disagreements. These concerns may be somewhat reduced by the 'Yellow Card' procedure which may alleviate or at least help dissipate some such disagreements to a reasonable extent.
Lisbon Subsidiarity thus seems to avoid several but not all of the weaknesses of the various theories of subsidiarity canvassed. Two main reasons are that it applies only among member states who have ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, thereby satisfying a threshold of legitimacy; and because the LT overrides member states' immunity and veto in a wide range of issues for the sake of the shared values and objectives -conflicts among these notwithstanding. The latter in turn raises important normative challenges when opinions diverge regarding the need for central action. The central upshot for our purposes is that the justifiability of Lisbon Subsidiarity is enhanced in part by reducing the state centric features laid out in several of the theories of subsidiarity canvassed above.
34 XXIII JOHN, Mater et Magistra, in The Papal Encyclicals 1958 (1961 
State Centric Subsidiarity in International Law assessed
We now return to assess claims that a principle of subsidiarity may help justify several 'state centric' features of international law, as a normative 'Constitutional Principle.'
Conceptions of a principle of subsidiarity may indeed offer a refreshing and helpful view on several aspects of international law, and on the relationship between state sovereignty and international institutions in general. Still, while some conceptions of subsidiarity may be justified from the point of view of cosmopolitan normative individualism, these do not support the centrality of states in international law. This centrality includes the primacy of state consent in creating legal obligations and an understanding of the main social function of public international law as securing the interests of states. Consider some areas where "the" Principle of Subsidiarity may well bring order, but where this centrality of states requires conceptions of subsidiarity that are normatively unconvincing.
States as Masters of Treaties
States remain dominant masters of treaties: They enjoy veto rights, and immunity except in areas explicitly agreed. Treaties only bind states that have agreed to do so.
States may make various reservations to these treaties, sometimes quite drastic, -as long as these reservations are not contrary to the object and purpose of the treaties. 37 Furthermore, states may exploit their bargaining power and withhold consent in order to secure a lion's share of any benefits. Due to this central role of state consent, treaties cannot be expected to restrain tyrannical states that will simply refrain from becoming party to such treaties, and thereby maintain immunity. Nor can treaties be expected to secure fair division of benefits of international cooperation, given the large differences in bargaining power among them.
Several authors thus lament the prominence and influence of states in public international law including human rights law, e.g. with regard to states' broad discretion, and the lack of sanctions. 38 They take this as evidence of the illegitimate bargaining power of sovereign states and the lamentable priority in international law of sovereignty over human rights. As sketched above, such immunity would still find support in Althusian and Confederal conceptions of subsidiarity. But these state centric elements are subject to severe criticism as indicated: these theories lack criteria for which legal orders may legitimately be included.
The presumption for state consent as a necessary requirement for legal obligations of states is surely open to normative questioning, especially with regard to states whose normative credentials are dubitable. Consider that states are recognized as sovereign largely in virtue of satisfying certain aspects of statehood as we know it, specified by international law -i.e. by states themselves -concerning population, territory and autonomy. The normative grounds for holding these criteria to be exhaustive of legitimate members of the community of states are absent. Michael Walzer has made similar claims, duly criticized, that ... any Leviathan state that is stable, that manages successfully to control its own people, is therefore legitimate. In a sense, that is right. In international society, Leviathan states, and many other sorts of states too, enjoy the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. 39 The sense of 'right' here is highly controversial: as a matter of legality, Walzer may well be correct. But it remains unclear why all states thus identified should enjoy such sovereign immunity. Insofar as it is states that de facto control territories and populations, effective and sustainable compliance -i.e. problem solving -may require states' consent. But state consent seems insufficient to determine whether the authority of an international institution is legitimate -in particular for dictatorships and other normatively worrisome states. Their consent does not suffice to grant the international institution normative legitimacy. This lack of 'normative quality control' of states is flawed in the same way as Althusian Subsidiarity, as long as public international law is unable to specify further requirements for which states should receive such standing.
The state centric versions of subsidiarity seem at a loss to defend this general presumption.
39 WALZER, 215; cf DOPPELT, Mattias Kumm and others have argued that state consent has become less central in international law more generally, which is no longer firmly grounded in the specific consent of states and its interpretation and enforcement is no longer primarily left to states. Contemporary international law has expanded its scope, loosened its link to state consent and strengthened compulsory adjudication and enforcement mechanisms. 40 State Centric Subsidiarity of the Althusian or Confederal ilk might lament such alleged developments toward a reduced role for state consent. I submit that more plausible conceptions of subsidiarity may instead welcome this trend -if the substantive contents of contemporary international law satisfy the appropriate normative standards.
Whether these developments are consistent with subsidiarity or other proposed standards of normative legitimacy is in part a matter of which alternative legislative mechanisms that might replace state consent, and whether there are other, better ways to control such authority -such as accountability mechanisms or constitutionalized guarantees and checks. is not how to defend this 'piercing of sovereignty', but rather how to set up reliable international human rights authorities that are themselves not likely to be abused. Thus the Catholic and Liberal Contractualist theories will agree with Althusian and Confederal conception about these real risks of abuse of central authority -but the former insist that other risks are also paramount.
The second issue of interpretation where state centric conceptions of subsidiarity may favour sovereignty but at the cost of normative credibility concerns the practice to accord the states a 'margin of appreciation' when it comes to determining compliance. This practice, mainly associated with the ECtHR, grants states the final authority to determine whether certain policies are in compliance with the ECHR -thus expressing the centrality of states. 45 Several authors note that this practice is no longer limited to the ECtHR, but is also found in the International Court of Justice. Some argue that it should be adopted for international law more generally. 46 Again, the Althusian and Confederal conceptions of subsidiarity will support an expansive margin of apprecition, while the Catholic and Liberal Contractualist accounts will be more concerned to also recognise the need to constrain the margin.
The various accounts will all agree that the rampant value pluralism and variations in natural and social conditions across states globally does counsel a certain leeway concerning how states should best respect and promote various objectivesincluding human rights. The room for discretion is especially important with several partly conflicting objectives, ranging from conflicts among human rights to conflicts between human rights and other important objectives. The different theories of subsidiarity will disagree more with regard to how and where to draw the limits of such a margin, partly due to different assessments of risks. Michael Walzer gives expression to a related ambivalence thus:
[the disagreement] has to do with the respect we are prepared to accord and the room we are prepared to yield to the political process itself, with all its messiness and uncertainty, its inevitable compromises, and its frequent brutality. It has to do with the range of outcomes we are prepared to tolerate, to accept as presumptively legitimate, though not necessarily to endorse. 47 Three cosmopolitan normative individualist reasons for constraining the margin is firstly, of course, to ensure the objectives of the treaties -in the case of human rights treaties: the protection and promotion of individuals' human rights against state inaction or worse. Even though they are also respectful of the values of local communities and shared ways of life, the less state centric conceptions of subsidiarity will be concerned to constrain such variations, in order to also secure other vital interests of individuals. One of the central challenges at the global level is indeed the broad range in domestic values and cultures -also concerning human rights. Some such claims of divergence may be overdrawn -witness the discussion some years ago about 'Asian values' versus human rights. 48 Still, the appropriate response to all violators of treaties whose defense is simply that the treaty is counter to their own values is hardly leniency. 49 Again, the presumption that states will be sufficiently respectful of their inhabitants' rights may be stronger in democracies than in more autocratic governments. The implication may be that such margins of appreciation should be broader for democracies -e.g. within in the EU -than for non-democratic states. The assessment of the democratic quality of any given state is no easy task, however -and underscores the risk of according courts and other treaty bodies too much discretion.
The second reason to constrain the margin of appreciation is precisely to reduce the risk of domination by the courts and treaty bodies. Flexibility in interpretation and adjudication by these bodies can be abused in the absence of mechanisms to ensure that their authority is exercised in pursuit of the stated objectives. The third reason to maintain a narrow margin is to protect the courts and treaty bodies against more powerful states. Writing about the ECtHR, Roland MacDonald notes that The general risk is that the margin of appreciation doctrine may be abused not by the courts, but by powerful signatories. There is a real risk that the powerful do as they will, and the weak do as they must. Thus the ECtHR may find itself the weak party when confronting a powerful signatory such as the EU. The risks of abuse of power may be even greater in the global sphere, with weaker treaty bodies.
The upshot is that whilst state-centric conceptions of subsidiarity are likely to favour granting states a broad margin of discretion, those conceptions more favoured by cosmopolitan normative individualism are more sceptical -while agreeing that the risk of granting treaty bodies authority is real and merit institutional responses.
Conclusion
What are we to conclude, then, about the claim that several aspects of international law are justified as based on a principle of subsidiarity? The upshot of the arguments laid out above is that such a claim is difficult to maintain. While a principle of subsidiarity can be found to support several important state centric features of international law, this version of subsidiarity suffers from weaknesses related to it being state centric. The veto power of all states regardless of their normative legitimacy, and the leeway granted states when assessing their compliance appear to lack normative justification. A principle of subsidiarity worth respecting according to cosmopolitan normative individualism would seem committed to the fostering of individuals' interests rather than those of states, and require that we assess states -and conceptions of subsidiarityin such terms. States' claims to sovereign authority should depend on whether their system of governance is sufficiently responsive to the best interests of their citizens and those of human beings in general. And their authority should be delineated and vetted by normative standards of legitimacy, instead of reflecting their current power in our system of states. Thus, attempts to justify several state centric aspects of public international law by such appeals to subsidiarity are found wanting.
This article has sought to argue that 'the' Principle of Subsidiarity cannot provide legitimacy or contribute to defensible structures in international law, including human rights law, on its own. While in general agreement with those who counsel some role for subsidiarity considerations, this paper cautions that the debates require attention to more items than are sometimes noted. The Principle of Subsidiarity stands in need of substantive interpretation, which must be guided by normative considerations. While a principle of subsidiarity may prove a helpful 'constitutional principle' in international human rights law and other international law, many crucial aspects require much further attention, including the standing of states. In particular, State centric subsidiarity has several weaknesses that seems to also inform international law. The Lisbon Treaty version of Subsidiarity avoids some of these problems by how it expresses and embeds its Principle of Subsidiarity: Only to member states and a Union that satisfy human rights standards. 'The' Principle of Subsidiarity cannot on its own provide legitimacy or contribute to a defensible allocation of authority between national and international institutions, e.g. regarding human rights law. Appeals to subsidiarity are too vague, and require attention to more items -including the standing of states, whether centre action is prohibited or required, and who should decide such issues. The more plausible versions of subsidiarity insist that ultimately, these questions are answered in light of which arrangement benefit individual persons' interests better than the alternatives.
Unrestricted sovereignty and state consent are not obvious parts of the solution.
